Abstract-This paper considers the problem of signal detection in distributed networks in the presence of data falsification (Byzantine) attacks. Detection approaches considered in the paper are based on fully distributed consensus algorithms, where all of the nodes exchange information only with their neighbors in the absence of a fusion center. For such networks, we first characterize the negative effect of Byzantines on the steady state and transient detection performance of conventional consensus-based detection algorithms. To avoid performance deterioration, we propose a distributed weighted average consensus algorithm that is robust to Byzantine attacks. We show that, under reasonable assumptions, the global test statistic for detection can be computed locally at each node using our proposed consensus algorithm. We exploit the statistical distribution of the nodes' data to devise techniques for mitigating the influence of data falsifying Byzantines on the distributed detection system. Since some parameters of the statistical distribution of the nodes' data might not be known a priori, we propose learning based techniques to enable an adaptive design of the local fusion or update rules. Numerical results are presented for illustration.
I. INTRODUCTION

D
ISTRIBUTED detection is a well studied topic in the detection theory literature [1] - [3] . The traditional distributed detection framework comprises of a group of spatially distributed nodes which acquire observations regarding the phenomenon of interest and send a compressed version to the fusion center (FC) where a global decision is made. However, in many scenarios, a centralized FC may not be available or the FC may become an information bottleneck causing degradation of system performance, potentially leading to system failure. Also, due to the distributed nature of future communication networks, and various practical constraints, e.g., absence of the FC, transmit power or hardware constraints and dynamic nature of the wireless medium, it may be desirable to employ alternate peerto-peer local information exchange in order to reach a global decision. One such decentralized approach for peer-to-peer loManuscript received January 14, 2016; revised April 29, 2016 and June 9, 2016; accepted August 6, 2016. Date of publication September 8, 2016 ; date of current version February 7, 2017 . This work was supported in part by ARO under Grant W911NF-14-1-0339. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Dr. Hamid Krim. (Corresponding author: Bhavya Kailkhura.) The authors are with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA (e-mail: bkailkhu@syr.edu; skbrahma@syr.edu; varshney@syr.edu).
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cal information exchange and inference is the use of a consensus algorithm [4] . Recently, distributed detection based on consensus algorithms has been explored in [5] - [10] . Consensus-based detection approaches operate in three phases. First, in the sensing phase, each node collects sufficient number of observations over a period of time (summary statistic). Second, in the information fusion phase, each node communicates only with its neighbors and updates its local state information (summary statistic) about the phenomenon by a local fusion rule that employs a weighted combination of its own value and those received from its neighbors. Nodes continue with these consensus iterations until the whole network converges to a steady-state value which is the global test statistic. Finally, in the decision making phase, nodes make their own decisions regarding the presence or the absence of the phenomenon.
In particular, the authors in [8] , [9] considered average consensus-based distributed detection and emphasized network designs based on the small world phenomenon for faster convergence [6] . A bio-inspired consensus scheme was introduced for spectrum sensing in [10] . However, these consensusbased fusion algorithms only ensure equal gain combining of local measurements. The authors in [5] proposed to use distributed weighted fusion algorithms for cognitive radio spectrum sensing. They showed that weighted average consensusbased schemes outperform average consensus-based schemes and achieve much better detection performance than the equal gain combining schemes.
More recently, other decentralized schemes [11] - [13] for distributed detection have been proposed where, as opposed to consensus based strategies, sensing and information fusion phases occur in the same time step. These strategies are particularly useful in scenarios where the hypothesis is rapidly changing and may change during the information fusion phase of the consensus strategies. However, in this paper, we focus only on consensus based distributed detection.
However, consensus-based detection schemes are quite vulnerable to different types of attacks. One typical attack on such networks is a Byzantine attack. While Byzantine attacks (originally proposed in [14] ) may, in general, refer to many types of malicious behavior, our focus in this paper is on datafalsification attacks [15] - [21] . In [17] , [18] , the authors considered the problem of distributed detection in the presence of Byzantines for a centralized model with fusion center and determined the optimal attacking strategy which minimizes the detection error exponent. The authors in [22] considered the problem of distributed detection with covert Byzantine attacks 2373-776X © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. in a centralized model. They obtained the optimal attacking strategy from the point of view of a smart adversary to disguise itself from the proposed detection scheme while accomplishing its attack. In our earlier work [23] on this problem, we analyzed the performance of data fusion schemes with Byzantines in a centralized model. 1 Thus far, research on detection in the presence of Byzantine attacks has predominantly focused on addressing these attacks under the centralized model in which information is available at the FC [17] , [18] , [21] , [23] , [24] . A few attempts have been made to address the security threats in "average" consensusbased detection schemes in recent research [25] - [30] . Most of these existing works on countering Byzantine or data falsification attacks in distributed networks rely on a threshold for detecting Byzantines. The main idea is to exclude nodes from the neighbors list whose state information deviates significantly from the mean value. In [26] and [29] , two different defense schemes against data falsification attacks for distributed consensus-based detection were proposed. In [26] , the scheme eliminates the state value with the largest deviation from the local mean at each iteration step and, therefore, it can only deal with the situation in which only one Byzantine node exists. Note that, it excludes one state value even if there is no Byzantine node. In [29] , the vulnerability of distributed consensus-based spectrum sensing was analyzed and an outlier detection algorithm with an adaptive threshold was proposed. The authors in [28] proposed a Byzantine mitigation technique based on adaptive local thresholds. This scheme mitigates the misbehavior of Byzantine nodes and tolerates the occasional large deviation introduced by honest users. It adaptively reduces the corresponding coefficients so that the Byzantines are eventually isolated from the network.
Excluding the Byzantine nodes from the fusion process may not be the best strategy from the network's perspective. As shown in our earlier work [21] in the context of distributed detection with one-bit measurements under a centralized model with an FC, an intelligent way to improve the performance of the network is to use the information of the identified Byzantines to the network's benefit. More specifically, learning-based techniques have the potential to outperform the existing exclusion-based techniques. In this paper, we pursue such a design philosophy in the context of raw data fusion in decentralized networks based on weighted average consensus algorithms. Byzantines can attack weighted average consensus algorithms in two ways: 1) nodes falsify their initial data, and 2) nodes falsify their weight values. To the best of the authors' knowledge, the susceptibility and protection of weighted average consensus-based detection schemes has not been considered in the literature. As will be seen later, in conventional consensus algorithms, weight manipulation cannot be detected.
To design methodologies for defending against Byzantine attacks, two fundamental challenges arise. First, how do nodes recognize the presence of attackers? Second, after identification of an attacker or group of attackers, how do nodes adapt their operating parameters? Due to the large number of nodes and complexity of the distributed network, we develop and analyze schemes where the nodes update their own operating parameters autonomously. Our approach further introduces an adaptive fusion based detection algorithm which supports the learning of the attackers' behavior. Our scheme differs from all existing work on Byzantine mitigation that are based on exclusion strategies [25] - [29] , where the only defense is to identify and exclude the attackers from the consensus process.
A. Main Contributions
In this paper, we focus on the susceptibility and protection of consensus-based detection algorithms. Our main contributions are summarized as follows: 1) We characterize the effect of Byzantines on the steadystate performance of the conventional consensus-based detection algorithms. More specifically, we quantify the minimum fraction of Byzantines needed to make the deflection coefficient of the global statistic equal to zero. 2) Using probability of detection and probability of false alarm as measures of detection performance, we investigate the degradation of transient detection performance of the conventional consensus algorithms in the presence of Byzantines. 3) We propose a robust distributed weighted average consensus algorithm which allows detection of weight manipulation by Byzantines and obtain closed-form expressions for optimal weights to mitigate the effect of data falsification attacks. 4) Finally, we propose a technique based on the expectationmaximization (EM) algorithm and maximum likelihood (ML) estimation to learn the operating parameters (or weights) of the nodes in the network to enable an adaptive design of the local fusion or update rules. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections II and III, we introduce our system model and Byzantine attack model, respectively. In Section IV, we study the security performance of weighted average consensus-based detection schemes. In Section V, we propose a protection mechanism to mitigate the effect of data falsification attacks on consensus-based detection schemes. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL Consider two hypotheses H 0 (signal is absent) and H 1 (signal is present). Also, consider N nodes organized in an undirected graph G which faces the task of determining which of the two hypotheses is true. First, we define the network model used in this paper.
A. Network Model
We model the network topology as an undirected graph G = (V, E), where V = {v 1 The adjacency matrix A of the graph is defined as
The neighborhood of a node i is defined as
The degree d i of a node v i is the number of edges in E which include v i as an endpoint, i.e.,
In other words, L = D − A. As an illustration, consider a network with six nodes trying to reach consensus (see Fig. 1 
The consensus-based distributed detection scheme usually contains three phases: sensing, information fusion, and decision making. In the sensing phase, each node acquires the summary statistic about the phenomenon of interest. In this paper, we adopt the energy detection method so that the local summary statistic is the received signal energy. Next, in the information fusion phase, each node communicates with its neighbors to update their state values (summary statistic) and continues with the consensus iteration until the whole network converges to a steady state which is the global test statistic. Finally, in the decision making phase, nodes make their own decisions about the presence of the phenomenon using this global test statistic. In the following each of these phases is described in more detail.
B. Sensing Phase
We consider an N -node network using the energy detection scheme [31] . For the ith node, the sensed signal z t i at time instant t is given by
where ζ i is the deterministic gain corresponding to the sensing channel, s t is the deterministic signal at time instant t, n t i
is AWGN, i.e., n 
where M is determined by the time-bandwidth product [31] . Since Y i is the sum of the squares of M i.i.d. Gaussian random variables, it can be shown that 
i is the local SNR at the ith node and E s = M t=1 |s t | 2 represents the sensed signal energy over M detection instants. Note that the local SNR is M times the average SNR at the output of the energy detector, which is
C. Information Fusion Phase
In this section, we give a brief introduction to conventional consensus algorithms [4] . and explain how consensus is reached using the following two steps.
Step 1: All nodes establish communication links with their neighbors, and broadcast their information state,
Step 2: Each node updates its local state information by a local fusion rule (weighted combination of its own value and those received from its neighbors) [4] . We denote node i's updated information at iteration k by x i (k). Node i continues to broadcast information x i (k) and update its local information state until consensus is reached. This process of updating information state can be written in a compact form as
where is the time step and w i is the weight given to node i's information. Using the notation
network dynamics can be represented in the matrix form as,
where,
L is referred to as a Perron matrix. The consensus algorithm is nothing but a local fusion or update rule that fuses the nodes' local information state with information coming from neighbor nodes, and it is well known that every node asymptotically reaches the same information state for arbitrary initial values [4] .
D. Decision Making Phase
The final information state x * after reaching consensus for the above consensus algorithm will be the weighted average of the initial states of all the nodes [4] 
Average consensus can be seen as a special case of weighted average consensus with w i = w, ∀i. After the whole network reaches a consensus, each node makes its own decision about the hypothesis using a predefined threshold λ
where weights are given by [5] 
In the rest of the paper,
w i is referred to as the final test statistic.
Next, we discuss Byzantine attacks on consensus-based detection schemes and analyze the performance degradation of the weighted average consensus-based detection algorithms due to these attacks.
III. ATTACKS ON CONSENSUS BASED DETECTION ALGORITHMS
When there are no adversaries in the network, we noted in the last section that consensus can be reached to the weighted average of arbitrary initial values by having the nodes use the update strategy x(k + 1) = W x(k) with an appropriate weight matrix W . However, suppose, that instead of broadcasting the true summary statistic Y i and applying the update strategy (1), some nodes (referred to as Byzantines) deviate from the prescribed strategies. Accordingly, Byzantines can attack in two ways: data falsification (nodes falsify their initial data or weight values) and consensus disruption (nodes do not follow the update rule given by (1)). More specifically, Byzantine node i can do the following Data falsification:
or w i is changed tow i Consensus disruption:
where (Δ i ,w i ) and u i (k) are introduced at the initialization step and at the update step k, respectively. The attack model considered above is extremely general, and allows Byzantine node i to update its value in a completely arbitrary manner (via appropriate choices of (Δ i ,w i ), and u i (k), at each time step). An adversary performing consensus disruption attack has the objective to disrupt the consensus operation. However, consensus disruption attacks can be easily detected because of the nature of the attack. Furthermore, the identification of consensus disruption attackers has been investigated in the past literature (e.g., see [6] , [31] ) where control theoretic techniques were developed to identify disruption attackers in a 'single' consensus iteration. However, these techniques cannot identify the data falsification attacker due to philosophically different nature of the problem. Also, notice that, by knowing the existence of such an identification mechanism, a smart adversary will aim to disguise itself while degrading the detection performance. In contrast to disruption attackers, data falsification attackers are more capable and can manage to disguise themselves while degrading the detection performance of the network by falsifying their data. Susceptibility and protection of consensus strategies to data falsification attacks has received scant attention, and this is the focus of our work. Our main focus 3 here is on the scenarios where an attacker performs a data falsification attack by introducing (Δ i ,w i ) during initialization. We exploit the statistical distribution of the initial values and devise techniques to mitigate the influence of Byzantines on the distributed detection system. Our approach for data falsification attacks on consensus-based detection systems complements the techniques proposed in [6] , [31] that are mainly focused on consensus disruption attacks.
A. Data Falsification Attack
In data falsification attacks, attackers try to manipulate the final test statistic (i.e., Λ =
in a manner so as to degrade the detection performance. We consider a network with N nodes that uses Algorithm (1) for reaching consensus. Weight w i , given to node i's data Y i in the final test statistic, is controlled or updated by node i itself while carrying out the iteration in Algorithm (1). So by falsifying initial values Y i or weights w i , the attackers can manipulate the final test statistic. Detection performance will be degraded because Byzantine nodes can always set a higher weight to their manipulated information. Thus, the final statistic's value across the whole network will be dominated by the Byzantine node's local statistic that will lead to degraded detection performance.
Next, we define a mathematical model for data falsification attackers. We analyze the degradation in detection performance of the network when Byzantines falsify their initial values Y i for fixed arbitrary weightsw i . 
B. Attack Model
where P i is the attack probability and Δ i is a constant value which represents the attack strength, which is zero for honest nodes. As we show later, Byzantine nodes will use a large value of Δ i so that the final statistic's value is dominated by the Byzantine node's local statistic leading to a degraded detection performance. We use deflection coefficient [33] to characterize the security performance of the detection scheme due to its simplicity and its strong relationship with the global detection performance. Deflection coefficient of the global test statistic is defined
, where
, is the conditional variance. The deflection coefficient is closely related to performance measures such as the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve [33] . In general, the detection performance monotonically increases with an increasing value of the deflection coefficient. We define the critical point of the distributed detection network as the minimum fraction of Byzantine nodes needed to make the deflection coefficient of the global test statistic equal to zero (in which case, we say that the network becomes blind) and denote it by α blind . We assume that the communication between nodes is error-free and our network topology is fixed during the whole consensus process and, therefore, consensus can be reached without disruption [4] .
In the next section, we analyze the security performance of consensus-based detection schemes in the presence of data falsifying Byzantines as modeled above. This analysis will be useful in revealing some quantitative relationships to judge the degradation of the detection performance with data falsifying Byzantines.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF CONSENSUS-BASED DETECTION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we analyze the effect of data falsification attacks on conventional consensus-based detection algorithms.
First, we characterize the effect of Byzantines on the steadystate performance of the consensus-based detection algorithms and determine α blind .
Without loss of generality, we assume that the nodes corresponding to the first N 1 indices i = 1, · · · , N 1 are Byzantines and the remaining nodes corresponding to in-
For data fusion schemes, the condition to blind the network or equivalently to make the deflection coefficient zero is given by
Proof. Please see Appendix A. Note that, when w i =w i = z, η i = η, σ i = σ, P i = P, Δ i = Δ, ∀i, the blinding condition simplifies to
Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Fig. 2 . We plot the deflection coefficient of the global test statistic as a function of attack parameters P i = P, Δ i = Δ, ∀i. We consider a 6-node network with the topology given by the undirected graph shown in Fig. 1 deployed to detect a phenomenon. Nodes 1 and 2 are considered to be Byzantines. Sensing channel gains of the nodes are assumed to be h = [0.8, 0.7, 0.72, 0.61, 0.69, 0.9] and weights are given by (2) . We also assume that M = 12, E s = 5, and σ 2 i = 1, ∀i. Notice that, the deflection coefficient is zero when the condition in Lemma 1 is satisfied. Another observation to make is that the deflection coefficient can be made zero even when only two out of six nodes are Byzantines. Thus, by appropriately choosing attack parameters (P, Δ), less than 50% of data falsifying Byzantines can blind the network.
Next, using the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm as measures of detection performance, we , as a function of consensus iteration t by assuming that each node makes its local decision using the information available at the end of iteration t. For analytical tractability, we assume that P i = P, ∀i. We denote by w t j i the element of matrix W t in the jth row and ith column. Using these notations, we calculate the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm at the jth node at consensus iteration t. For clarity of exposition, we first derive our results for a small network with two Byzantine nodes and one honest node (see Appendix B). Due to the probabilistic nature of the Byzantine's behavior, it may behave as an honest node with a probability (1 − P ). Let S denote the set of all combinations of such Byzantine strategies:
where by b i we mean that Byzantine node i behaves as a Byzantine and by h i we mean that Byzantine node i behaves as an honest node. Let A s ∈ U denote the indices of Byzantines behaving as an honest node in the strategy combination s, then, from (6) we have
where {} is used to denote the null set. Let us use m s to denote the cardinality of subset A s ∈ U . Using these notations, we generalize our results for any arbitrary N . Lemma 2. The test statistic of node j at consensus iteration t, i.e.,Λ
The performance of the detection scheme in the presence of Byzantines can be represented in terms of the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm of the network.
Proposition 1. The probability of detection and the probability of false alarm of node j at consensus iteration t in the presence of Byzantines can be represented as
where λ is the threshold used for detection by node j. Next, to gain insights into the results given in Proposition 1, we present some numerical results in Figs. 3 and 4 . We consider the 6-node network shown in Fig. 1 where the nodes employ the consensus algorithm 1 with = 0.6897 to detect a phenomenon. Nodes 1 and 2 are considered to be Byzantines. We also assume that η i = 10, σ 2 i = 2, λ = 33 and w i = 1. Attack parameters are assumed to be (P i , Δ i ) = (0.5, 6) andw i = 1.1. To characterize the transient performance of the weighted average consensus algorithm, in Fig. 3(a) , we plot the probability of detection as a function of the number of consensus iterations without Byzantines, i.e., (Δ i = 0,w i = w i ). Next, in Fig. 3(b) , we plot the probability of detection as a function of the number of consensus iterations in the presence of Byzantines. It can be seen that the detection performance degrades in the presence of Byzantines. In Fig. 4(a) , we plot the probability of false alarm as a function of the number of consensus iterations without Byzantines, i.e., (Δ i = 0,w i = w i ). Next, in Fig. 4(a) , we plot the probability of false alarm as a function of the number of consensus iterations in the presence of Byzantines. From both Figs. 3 and 4 , it can be seen that the Byzantine attack can severely degrade transient detection performance.
From the discussion in this section, we can see that Byzantines can severely degrade both the steady-state and the transient detection performance of conventional consensus-based detection algorithms. As mentioned earlier, a data falsifying Byzantine i can tamper its weight w i as well as its sensing data Y i to degrade detection performance. One approach to mitigate the effect of sensing data falsification is to assign weights based on the quality of the data. In other words, a lower weight can be given to the data of the node identified as a Byzantine. However, to implement this approach one has to address the following two issues.
First, in the conventional weighted average consensus algorithm, weight w i given to node i's data is controlled or updated by the node itself (see discussion in Section III-A). Thus, a Byzantine node can always set a higher weight to its manipulated information and the final statistics will be dominated by the Byzantine nodes' local statistic that will lead to degraded detection performance. It will be impossible for any algorithm to detect this type of malicious behavior, since any weight that a Byzantine chooses for itself is a legitimate value that could also have been chosen by a node that is functioning correctly. Thus, in the conventional consensus algorithms weight manipulation cannot be detected and therefore, conventional consensus algorithms cannot be used in the presence of an attacker.
Second, as will be seen later, the optimal weights given to nodes' sensing data depend on the following unknown parameters: identity of the nodes, which indicates whether the node is honest or Byzantine, and underlying statistical distribution of the nodes' data.
In the next section, we address these concerns by proposing a learning based robust weighted average consensus algorithm.
V. A ROBUST CONSENSUS BASED DETECTION ALGORITHM
In order to address the first issue discussed in Section IV, which is the optimal weight design, we propose a consensus algorithm in which the weight for node i's information is controlled (or updated) by the neighbors of node i rather than by node i itself. Note that, networks deploying such an algorithm are more robust to weight manipulation because if a Byzantine node j wants to assign an incorrect weight to the data of its neighbor i in the global test statistic, it has to ensure that all the neighbors of node i put the same incorrect weight as node j. Furthermore, the proposed algorithm enables the detection of weight-manipulating Byzantines (in contrast to conventional consensus algorithms). The attack can be treated as a consensus disruption attack and weight manipulation can be detected, unless all the neighbors of honest nodes are Byzantines 4 .
A. Distributed Algorithm for Weighted Average Consensus
In this section, we address the following questions: does there exist a distributed algorithm that solves the weighted average consensus problem while satisfying the condition that weights must be controlled (or updated) by neighbors N i of node i rather than by node i itself? If such an algorithm exists, then, what are the conditions or constraints for the algorithm to converge?
We consider a network of N nodes with a fixed and connected topology G(V, E). Next, we state Perron-Frobenius theorem [34] , which will be used later for the design and analysis of our robust weighted average consensus algorithm.
Theorem 1 ([34] ). Let W be a primitive non-negative matrix with left and right eigenvectors u and v, respectively, satisfying
Using the above theorem, we take a reverse-engineering approach to design a modified Perron matrixŴ which has the weight vector w = [w 1 , w 2 
T , w i > 0, ∀i as its left eigenvector and 1 as its right eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue 1. From the above theorem, if the modified Perron matrixŴ is primitive and non-negative, then a weighted average consensus can be achieved. Now, the problem boils down to designing such aŴ which meets our requirement that weights are controlled (or updated) by the neighbors N i of node i rather than by node i itself.
For this purpose, we propose a modified Perron matrix
where L is the original graph Laplacian, ⊗ is element-wise matrix multiplication operator, and T is a transformation given by
Observe that, the above transformation T satisfies the condition that weights are controlled (or updated) by neighbors N i of node i rather than by node i itself. Based on the above transformation T , we propose our distributed consensus algorithm:
Note that, the form of our update equation is different from the conventional update equation. Let us denote the modified Perron matrix byŴ = I − L , whereL = T ⊗ L.
We then explore the properties of the modified Perron matrix W and show that it satisfies the requirements of the PerronFrobenius theorem [34] . These properties will later be utilized to prove the convergence of our proposed consensus algorithm. To prove part 2), notice that all the eigenvectors ofŴ and L are the same. Let γ j be the jth eigenvalue ofL, then, the jth eigenvalue ofŴ is λ j = 1 − γ j . Now, part 2) can be proved by applying Gershgorin theorem [34] to the modified Laplacian matrixL.
To prove part 3), note that G is strongly connected and, therefore,Ŵ is an irreducible matrix [34] . Thus, to prove thatŴ is a primitive matrix, it is sufficient 6 to show thatŴ has a single eigenvalue with maximum modulus of 1. In [4] , the authors showed that when 0 < < max i j =i a ij , the original Perron matrix W has only one eigenvalue with maximum modulus 1 at its spectral radius. Using a similar logic,Ŵ is a primitive matrix if 0 < < 1/max
Theorem 2. Consider a network with fixed and strongly connected undirected topology G(V, E) that employs the distributed consensus algorithm
Then, consensus is reached asymptotically with primitive nonnegative matrixŴ respectively. Thus, from [34] 
Next, to gain insights into the convergence property of the proposed algorithm, we present some numerical results in Fig. 5 . We consider the 6-node network shown in Fig. 1 where the nodes employ the proposed algorithm (with = 0.3) to reach a consensus. Next, we plot the updated state values at each node as a function of consensus iterations. We assume that the initial data vector is x(0) = [5, 2, 7, 9, 8, 1] T and the weight vector is w = [0.65, 0.55, 0.48, 0.95, 0.93, 0.90] T . Note that, the parameter satisfies the condition mentioned in Theorem 2. Fig. 5 shows the convergence of the proposed algorithm iterations. It is observed that within 20 iterations consensus has been reached on the global decision statistics, the weighted average of the initial values (states).
In the proposed consensus algorithm, weights given to node i's data are updated by neighbors of the node i rather than by node i itself which addresses the first issue discussed in Section IV.
B. Adaptive Design of the Update Rules Based on Learning of Nodes' Behavior
Next, to address the second issue discussed in Section IV, we exploit the statistical distribution of the sensing data and devise techniques to mitigate the influence of Byzantines on the distributed detection system. We propose a three-tier mitigation scheme where the following three steps are performed at each node: 1) identification of Byzantine neighbors, 2) estimation of parameters of identified Byzantine neighbors, and 3) adaptation of consensus algorithm (or update weights) using estimated parameters.
We first present the design of distributed optimal weights for the honest/Byzantine nodes assuming that the identities of the nodes are known. Later we will explain how the identity of nodes (i.e., honest/Byzantine) can be determined.
1) Design of Distributed Optimal Weights in the Presence of Byzantines:
In this subsection, we derive closed form expressions for the distributed optimal weights which maximize the deflection coefficient. First, we consider the global test statis- 
where μ 1 , μ 0 and σ 2 (0) are given in (3), (4) and (5), respectively. The solution of the above problem is presented in the next lemma.
Lemma 4. Optimal centralized weights which maximize the deflection coefficient are given as
Proof. The above results can be obtained by setting the derivative of the deflection coefficient equal to zero and solving the equation. Note that, the constraint is trivially satisfied by normalizing the obtained weights as the value of deflection coefficient is unchanged after normalization.
The optimality of the weights in Lemma 4 can also be verified by upper bounding the expression of deflection coefficient using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and observing that this upper bound is achieved by the weights in Lemma 4.
Remark 1. Distributed optimal weights can be chosen as w
and w H i . Thus, the value of the global test statistic (or final weighted average consensus) is the same as the optimal centralized weighted combining scheme 7 . 7 Note that, weights w B i can be negative and in that case convergence of the proposed algorithm is not guaranteed. However, this situation can be dealt off-line by adding a constant value to make w B i ≥ 0 and changing the threshold λ accordingly. More specifically, by choosing a constant c such that
≥ 0, ∀i and λ ← λ + βc where β is the number of nodes with w B i < 0. Next, to gain insights into the solution, we present some numerical results in Fig. 6 that corroborate our theoretical results. We assume that M = 12, η i = 3, σ 2 i = 0.5 and the attack parameters are (P i , Δ i ) = (0.5, 9). In Fig. 6 , we compare our proposed weighted average consensus-based detection scheme with the equal gain combining scheme 8 and the scheme where Byzantines are excluded from the fusion process. It can be clearly seen from the figure that our proposed scheme performs better than the rest of the schemes.
Next, in Fig. 7 , we plot the probability of detection of the proposed scheme as a function of the attack strength Δ for P i = 1. The threshold λ is chosen to constrain the probability of false alarm below a constant δ = 0.01. Also, we assume that M = 12, η i = 10, σ 2 i = 6. It can be seen from the figure that the worst detection performance is when the deflection coefficient is zero which also implies that the attacker is not providing any information or is excluded from the data fusion process. The reason for this is that when the deflection coefficient is nonzero, the information provided by the attacker is also non-zero which is being utilized by the proposed scheme to improve the detection performance.
Notice that, the optimal weights for the Byzantines are functions of the attack parameters (P i , Δ i ), which may not be known to the neighboring nodes in practice. In addition, the parameters of the honest nodes might also not be known. Therefore, we propose a technique to learn or estimate these parameters. We then use these estimates to adaptively design the local fusion rule which are updated after each learning iteration.
2) Identification, Estimation, and Adaptive Fusion Rule: The first step at each node m is to determine the identity (I i ∈ {H, B}) of its neighboring nodes i ∈ N m . Notice that, if node i is an honest node, its data under hypothesis H k is normally distributed N ((μ 1k ) i , (σ 1k ) Node classification can then be achieved using the maximum likelihood decision rule:
where f (Y i | I l ) is the probability density function (PDF) of Y i under each hypothesis I l . However, the parameters of the distributions are not known. Next, we propose a technique to learn these parameters. For an honest node i, the parameters to be estimated are ((μ 1k ) i , (σ 1k ) 2 i ) and for Byzantines the unknown parameter set to be estimated is θ = {α
for N m neighboring nodes. These parameters are estimated by observing the data over multiple learning iterations. In each learning iteration t, each node in the network employs the data coming from their neighbors for D detection intervals to learn their respective parameters. It is assumed that each node has the knowledge of the past D hypothesis test results (or history) through a feedback mechanism. 9 Also, notice that the learning is done in a separate learning phase and is not a part of consensus iterations.
First, we explain how the unknown parameter set for the distribution under the null hypothesis (I 0 ) can be estimated. Let us denote the data coming from an honest neighboring node i as 
where expressions for (σ 10 ) 2 i and (σ 11 ) 2 i are given in (8) and (9), respectively are shown at the bottom of the page. Observe that, by writing these expressions in a recursive manner, we need to store only D data samples at any given learning iteration t, but effectively use all tD data samples to determine the estimates.
Next, we explain how the unknown parameter set for the distribution under the alternate hypothesis (I 1 ) can be estimated. Since the data is distributed as a Gaussian mixture, we employ the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to estimate the unknown parameter set for Byzantines. Let us denote the data coming from a Byzantine neigh-
where D 1 (t) denotes the number of times H 0 occurred in learning iteration t andỹ k i denotes the data of node i when the true hypothesis was H k . Let us denote the hidden variable as z j with j = {1, 2} or (Z = [z 1 , z 2 ]). Now, the joint conditional PDF ofỹ k i and z j , given the parameter set is
In the expectation step of EM, we compute the expectation of the log-likelihood function with respect to the hidden variables z j , given the measurementsỸ i , and the current estimate of the parameter set θ l . This is given by
In the maximization step of the EM algorithm, we maximize Q(θ, θ l ) with respect to the parameter set θ so as to compute the next parameter set:
First, we maximize Q(θ, θ l ) subject to the constraint
Now, we equate the derivative of L to zero:
Multiplying both sides by α i j and summing over j gives λ = −D. Similarly, we equate the derivative of Q(θ, θ l ) with respect to (μ j k ) i and (σ k ) 2 i to zero. Now, an iterative algorithm
for all the parameters is
In the learning iteration t, let the estimates after the convergence of the above algorithm be denoted byθ(t) = {α
These estimates are then used as the initial values for the next learning iteration t + 1 that uses a new set of D data samples.
After learning the unknown parameter set under I 0 and I 1 , node classification can be achieved using the following maximum likelihood decision rule:
wheref (·) is the PDF based on estimated parameters. Using the above estimates and node classification, the optimal distributed weights for honest nodes after learning iteration t can be written as
Similarly, the optimal distributed weights for Byzantines after learning iteration t can be written as
where
. Next, we present some numerical results in Fig. 8 to evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme. Consider the scenario where 6 nodes organized in an undirected graph (as shown in Fig. 1 ) are trying to detect a phenomenon. Node 1 and node 2 are Note that, the above learning based scheme can be used in conjunction with the proposed weighted average consensusbased algorithm to mitigate the effect of Byzantines.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we analyzed the security performance of conventional consensus-based algorithms in the presence of data falsification attacks. We showed that above a certain fraction of Byzantine attackers in the network, existing consensus-based detection algorithm are ineffective. Next, we proposed a robust distributed weighted average consensus algorithm and devised a learning technique to estimate the operating parameters (or weights) of the nodes. This enables an adaptive design of the local fusion or update rules to mitigate the effect of data falsification attacks. We demonstrated that the proposed scheme, which uses the information of the identified Byzantines to network's benefit, outperforms exclusion based approaches where the only defense is to identify and exclude the attackers from the consensus process. There are still many interesting questions that remain to be explored in the future work such as an analysis of the problem for time varying topologies. Note that, some analytical methodologies used in this paper are certainly exploitable for studying the attacks in time varying topologies. Other questions such as the optimal topology so as to result in the fastest convergence rate and the problem with covert data falsification attacks with a smart adversary who disguises himself from the proposed detection scheme while accomplishing its attack can also be investigated. Also, in this paper, we have assumed that the hypothesis does not change during the consensus iterations. One interesting direction to consider in the future is to study the problem where hypotheses are allowed to change during the information fusion phase. 
where φ(x|μ, σ 2 ) (for notational convenience denoted as φ(μ, σ 2 )) is the PDF of X ∼ N (μ, σ 2 ) and φ(x|μ, σ 2 ) = 
